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Introduction 
The perceived impact of location on economic opportunity has been a 
constant refrain in discussions of the economic performance of the United 
Kingdom for as long as anyone can remember and the source of much feel- 
ing that the British economy is not as flexible as it should be. In the 1980s 
the preoccupation was with the so-called “North-South divide,” the con- 
trast between the booming southern part of England with its economy 
based on the service sector and the depressed Northern regions whose 
economies were struggling to deal with the decimation of the heavy man- 
ufacturing on which they had previously depended in the Thatcher reces- 
sion of the early 1980s. The North-South divide appeared to diminish in 
the recession of the early 1990s, but there have been concerns in some quar- 
ters that it is reemerging in recent years. 
More recently attention has moved away from differences in economic 
opportunity at the level of very aggregated regions and toward differences 
at a much more local level (e.g., see Noble et al. 2000). A Cabinet Office re- 
port to the Prime Minister (Cabinet Office 1999, 11) noted that “the dispar- 
ity within regions is at least as great as that between them.” For example, 
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inner London has some of the highest unemployment rates in the whole 
country at the same time that the shops of Oxford Street have the highest 
level of vacancies in the country. After his victory in the 1997  election, Tony 
Blair set up the Social Exclusion Unit, which cuts across traditional minis- 
terial boundaries to deal with the consequences of when people or areas 
suffer from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor 
skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime environments,  bad health 
and family breakdown. Its existence is based on the idea that there is a need 
for joined up solutions to  joined up problems. While there have always been 
rich and poor neighborhoods, there is also a feeling that the poorest areas 
have not shared in the growing prosperity of the country. At its most melo- 
dramatic, one might argue that Britain is ghettoizing. 
Many commentators have felt that the structure of the U.K. housing 
market contributes to some of the spatial problems that the United King- 
dom faces. In the early 1980s Hughes and McCormick (1981) argued that 
the level of subsidy and the allocation of housing within the council sector 
made council tenants very immobile and made the emergence of regions or 
pockets of unemployment more likely. In the 1990s Muellbauer and his 
coauthors (e.g., Muellbauer and Murphy 1997; Cameron and Muellbauer 
1998)  argued that the cult of owner-occupation together with financial mar- 
ket deregulation makes housing prices in the United Kingdom follow spec- 
ulative bubbles that interfere with the workings of the real economy. And, 
more recently, Oswald (1996, 1997) has suggested that home ownership is 
bad (or sometimes it is private renting that is good) for unemployment.' 
The plan of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we present evi- 
dence on the extent of regional inequalities in the United Kingdom and 
whether they have worsened over time. Regional inequalities in Britain are 
substantial, but they have always been so, and there is no strong evidence 
of a dramatic change over time. However, we also emphasize how success- 
ful the United Kingdom has been in creating an integrated national labor 
market for graduates and argue that the key to understanding how we can 
reduce regional inequalities lies, in part, in understanding the differences 
between the graduate and nongraduate labor markets. A number of pos- 
sible reasons for the successful creation of  an integrated graduate labor 
market are considered. 
First, we show that regional migration rates are much higher for gradu- 
ates than the less educated and that this is likely to be the main reason why 
the graduate labor market is more integrated. But why should migration 
rates be so much higher for graduates? It is argued that the returns to mi- 
gration may well be smaller for graduates than others so that any explana- 
I. An earlier version of this paper did contain a section evaluating this hypothesis, but the 
evidence for it in the United Kingdom was so weak that this has been dropped from the final 
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tion must be based on differing costs of migration. We consider a number 
of hypotheses. 
First, it may be that the process of leaving home to go to college provides 
a psychological break with the region of one’s childhood, and we do pres- 
ent evidence that graduates are less likely to take a first job in their parental 
region if they moved away to college. 
Second, we go on to consider the determinants of residential mobility. 
Most existing studies have emphasized that residential and regional mo- 
bility in the United Kingdom is much lower than in the United States but 
that the unemployed are more likely to move than the employed. We argue 
that it is extremely rare for the unemployed to move regions without first 
having found a job. As vacancies for the less skilled tend to be advertised 
only locally, it is then very hard for the less skilled to move regions, and this 
is a major reason for the lower migration rates of the less skilled. When the 
labor market is booming, employers in the most prosperous regions may 
be forced to advertise more widely to recruit even unskilled workers. We 
then get the pattern (seen in the data) that it is easier to move to a high- 
employment region when times are good, although, ironically, it tends to 
be only when times are bad that anyone starts  worrying about the low levels 
of regional mobility. 
We  also consider the impact of housing tenure on mobility. We  argue 
that the apparent negative impact of being in council housing on regional 
mobility may have less to do with the rent subsidy associated with council 
housing and more to do with the demographic profile of tenants. 
The paper then moves on to consider inequalities between neighbor- 
hoods. Using census data from 1981 and 1991 we show that there was little 
change in the of distribution of unemployment and nonemployment rates 
across neighborhoods. While there are big differences between rich and 
poor areas, there seems to be little evidence that these have worsened over 
time. We also consider one of the biggest changes to affect neighborhoods 
in this period, the sale of council houses. We show that, even in the neigh- 
borhoods with the highest rates of council housing, something like 20 per- 
cent of the stock was sold. Those likely to buy were much more likely to be 
better off (e.g., older households, those with dual earners, the more edu- 
cated, and those from higher social classes). But we could find no evidence 
that sales of council houses resulted in a change in the social composition 
of a neighborhood other than the obvious impact of the change in housing 
tenure. 
. 
9.1  Regional Inequalities 
Regional  differences in  economic performance are well  known  (see 
Blackaby and Manning 1990; Hughes and McCormick 1994; Evans and 
McCormick  1994) and will only briefly be summarized here. Panel A of 374  Paul Gregg, Stephen Machin, and Alan Manning 
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Fig. 9.1  A,  The standard deviation of regional relative male employment- 
population ratios; B, the standard deviation of regional relative female employment- 
population ratios; C, the standard deviation of regional male unemployment rates; 
D, the standard deviation of regional female unemployment rates 
Notes: A, This graph plots the population-weighted standard deviation of the employment- 
population ratio relative to the aggregate employment-population ratio across regions; C, 
these are the labor-force weighted standard deviations in the regional unemployment rates. 
figure 9.1  presents the evolution  of the standard deviation  of  the male 
employment-population  ratio  across regions.  Several points  stand out. 
First, there was a large rise in the standard deviation in the early 198Os, and 
although there has been a decline since, the gap is still wider than it was in 
the late  1970s. Second (as has been pointed  out by  McCormick,  1997, 
among others), regional differences are entirely the result of differences in 
employment-population  ratios  among less-skilled  workers.2 Panel  B of 
2. One should remember that the increase in educational attainment over time means that 
the low-skilled group is decreasing in importance. Mobility and Joblessness  375 
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Fig. 9.1  (cont.) 
figure 9.1 presents the standard deviation of relative regional female em- 
ployment-population ratios, and panels C and D of figure 9.1 do the same 
for regional male and female unemployment rates. In all cases, the limited 
extent of regional inequalities among the educated is very clear.3 For ex- 
ample, in 1999 the male employment-population ratio for university grad- 
uates (International Standard Classification of  Education [ISCED] 5-7) 
ranged from 86 percent in South Yorkshire to 95 percent in the Southeast 
(excluding London), while that for those without educational qualifica- 
3. In this paper we classify education using the ISCED measure: In the British education 
system ISCED 0-1  corresponds to those without any formal qualifications, ISCED 2 corre- 
sponds to those who left school at age sixteen but with some qualifications (“0”  levels or Gen- 
eral Certificate of Secondary Education [GCSEs]), ISCED 3 corresponds to those who left 
school at age eighteen with “A” levels, and ISCED 5-7  corresponds to those with some terti- 
ary education (mostly college graduates). 376  Paul Gregg, Stephen Machin, and Alan Manning 
Table 9.1  Persistence in Regional Unemployment Rates 
Correlation Coefficient 
CountrylEducation  79-99  89  99 
United Kingdom 
All  0.77  0.86 
ISCED 0-1  0.77  0.86 
ISCED 2  0.58  0.69 
ISCED 3  0.56  0.46 
ISCED 5-7  0.28  -0.13 
All  0.38  0.55 
United States 
Note; These are the correlation coefficients for the unemployment rates across eighteen U.K. 
regions and fifty U.S. states. 
tions ranged from 56 percent in Tyne and Wear to 82 percent in the South- 
east (excluding London). 
There are other ways of seeing that the United Kingdom has successfully 
created an integrated labor market for graduates. The previous figure shows 
us the variation in unemployment rates but says nothing about persistence. 
Table 9.1 presents some simple correlations to shed light on this issue.4 Re- 
gional unemployment rates show a high degree of correlation over this pe- 
riod, but this is almost entirely the consequence of high correlations among 
the less educated. As a reference point (though differences in geographical 
size makes comparisons problematic) we also report the correlation in un- 
employment rates across U.S. states. The U.K. graduate labor market ap- 
pears to be more integrated than the aggregate U.S. labor market. There is 
nothing intrinsic to the British character that makes an integrated national 
labor market an impossibility: One should look for more mundane expla- 
nations. 
So far we have documented the extent of regional inequalities but with- 
out identifying their nature. Most popular discussion thinks of regional 
inequalities in terms of the North-South divide, but it is not obvious that 
this is the most striking geographical distinction one could make. Figure 
9.2 presents the evolution in the unemployment rates and employment- 
population ratios for the North and the South and also for the metropoli- 
tan and nonmetropolitan areas. In many ways the gap between the metro- 
politan and nonmetropolitan areas is as striking as that of the North-South 
divide. 
4. It might be better to estimate dynamic responses to regional shocks along the lines of 
Blanchard and Katz (1992) or Decressin and Fatas (1995). However, lack of data makes it im- 
possible to do this disaggregated by education, and the correlations presented in table 9.1 
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Fig. 9.2  The North-South divide and the met-non-met gap: A, male employment-population  ratios; B, female employment- 
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We might also be interested in regional differences in wages. Compari- 
son of the extent and evolution of regional wage inequality is complicated 
by the fact that it is obviously important to consider differences in real liv- 
ing standards, yet there are no official regional price indices for the United 
Kingdom. The main (and possibly the only) source of difference in regional 
prices is differences in housing costs. Duranton and Monastiriotis (2000) 
show that, although the aggregate figures appear to show an increase in re- 
gional inequality, this becomes a decline once one controls for differences 
in worker characteristics across regions and differences in regional living 
standards (see also Cameron and Muellbauer, 2000, for a discussion of the 
problems associated with the use of U.K. regional wage statistics). 
There are a number of reasons why there might be more regional varia- 
tion in employment and unemployment for the less educated. First, it may 
be that the shocks that affect regional labor markets are more substantial 
for the less educated. Second, it may be that the responsiveness to shocks 
is greater for the less educated (Hoynes, 1999, has presented some evidence 
for this in the United States). Third, it may be that regional migration acts 
as a “shock absorber” for regional shocks. It is difficult to distinguish be- 
tween these hypotheses, although the fact that there is much more persist- 
ence in regional unemployment rates for the less educated suggests that 
migration might be the place to look for an explanation. This is the subject 
of the next section. 
9.2  “On yer bike”: Lack of Work and Residential Mobility 
One way to escape any economic disadvantage associated with location 
is to move to a better area. In the 1980s the then Conservative minister for 
employment, Norman Tebbitt, observed that his father had not sat around 
on his backside in the Great Depression moaning about the lack of jobs: 
He had gotten on his bike and had looked for work. He is not the only per- 
son to have had similar thoughts. Over the years economists have worried 
about the lack of willingness of the British to move location to find work. 
It is interesting to know whether overall residential and regional mobil- 
ity rates have changed in the past twenty years. Figure 9.3 presents a time 
series on  residential mobility rates over the past twenty years using Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) data. Residential mobility rates have varied between 
10 and 13 percent, reaching a peak in the housing market frenzy of the late 
1980s and then a trough in the subsequent crash (when house prices fell 
substantially). Figure 9.4 shows the evolution of regional mobility over the 
same period. The fraction of working-age individuals who have moved re- 
gions has only varied  between 2 and 3 percent  per  annum in  the last 
twenty-five years. The fraction coming from outside the United Kingdom 
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Fig. 9.3  Residential mobility in the United Kingdom, 1977-1999 
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Fig. 9.4  Regional mobility in the United Kingdom: LFS data 
Notes; The top line is the fraction of the population aged eighteen-sixty who have moved re- 
gions in the past year. The bottom line is the percentage who were outside the United King- 
dom a year ago, and the middle line is the fraction who have moved regions within the United 
Kingdom. 
been in regional mobility within the United Kingdom. As for residential 
mobility, there was a peak in the late 1980s  and then a very marked decline, 
since which time there has only been a weak recovery. Figure 9.5 presents 
data on internal migration rates (for those of all ages) from a different data 
source: the National Health Service Central Register (NHSCR), which is 
based on people's changing doctors. Two series are presented with an over- 380  Paul Gregg, Stephen Machin, and Alan Manning 
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Fig. 9.5  Regional mobility in Britain: NHSCR data 
Notes: This data comes from the NHSCR and is based on individuals  changing doctors. It ap- 
plies to all individuals. 
lap, the first based on the old standard planning regions and the second 
based on the new government office  region^.^ Internal migration appears 
higher on the new regional definition and seems to now be at  levels last seen 
in the late 1980s. Neither the LFS nor the NHSCR seems to support the 
second part of the claim by Hughes and McCormick (2000, 16) that there 
is “a striking increase in overall migration in the mid to late 1990s to rates 
in excess of those seen during any time in the last quarter century,”6  but it 
does seem to be the case that regional migration is currently at levels simi- 
lar to those seen at similar cyclical peaks in the past twenty-five years. 
The U.K. mobility rates do not seem to be out of line with those found 
in other European countries. Table 9.2 uses data from the 1996-1997 wave 
of the European Community Household Panel (ECHPS) to calculate that 
around 8 percent of U.K. households moved in the year preceding the sur- 
vey, which is in the middle of the range of mobility rates for the countries 
in the table. However, these numbers are considerably below those found in 
the “New World” countries (see Greenwood, 1997, table 1). 
We saw earlier that there is much less regional variation in labor market 
outcomes for the more educated. Figure 9.6 shows that there is more re- 
gional mobility among the more educated with the regional mobility rate 
5.  The difference between the two is that Cumbria has been moved from the North to the 
Northwest region, and Bedfordshire,  Essex, and Hertfordshire from the Southeast to the 
Eastern region. The latter change is by far the most substantive. 
6. They use LFS data for the 1980s, but data from the Survey of English Housing for the 
1990s. It is possible that the measures from the two data sets are not comparable. Mobility and Joblessness  381 
Table 9.2  Residential Mobility Rates in European Countries, 1996-1997 

























Note: Calculated from the 1996-1997  wave of the ECHPS. 
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Fig. 9.6  Regional mobility in the United Kingdom, by level of education 
Note: This data comes from the LFS. 
for graduates currently being more than twice the level of that for those 
without any educational qualifications. But, interestingly, the gap appears 
to be narrowing: In 1979 the regional mobility rate for graduates was four 
times that of nongraduates. 
Migration does not inevitably act to reduce differentials in unemploy- 
ment: For it to have this effect it needs to be predominantly from high- 
unemployment regions to low-unemployment regions. A crude way of con- 
sidering the extent to which migrants do tend to move in this direction is 
presented in figure 9.7, which presents the average regional male employ- 382  Paul Gregg, Stephen Machin, and Alan Manning 
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Fig. 9.7 
Notes: The employment-population ratio for those who will stay in their region is the em- 
ployment-population ratio in the current region for those who do not move in the following 
year. The employment-population ratio for those who will move in their region is the em- 
ployment-population ratio in the current region for those who do  move in the following year 
(i,e,,  it is the employment-population  ratio in the source region). The employment-population 
ratio for those who have stayed in their region is the employment-population  ratio in the cur- 
rent region for those who have not moved in the past year. The  employment-population  ratio 
for those who have moved regions is the employment-population  ratio in the current region 
for those who have moved in the past year (i.e., it is the employment-population  ratio in the 
destination region). 
Regional male employment-population  ratios for movers and stayers 
ment-population ratios for those who have stayed in the same region in the 
past year, for those who have moved, for those who will stay in the coming 
year, and for those who will move. If those in high-unemployment regions 
are more likely to move we  would expect to see a higher employment- 
population ratio for stayers compared to those who will move. And, if 
movers tend to go to areas of lower unemployment, we would expect to see 
a higher employment-population  ratio for those who have moved com- 
pared to those who have stayed. The lines are very close, although there is 
some tendency for the movers to be in high-employment regions, particu- 
larly in  the early  1980s recovery. This indicates that migration  is  only 
weakly related to unemployment differentials. 
A somewhat clearer way of presenting the same information is in figure 
9.8 where we compare the change in the regional employment-population 
ratios for those who stay in the same region and for those who move. If the 
movers are motivated by improved labor market conditions then we would 
expect the change in the employment-population  ratio to be consistently 
above that for the stayers. On average, the gap is positive though small, a 
fact that, combined with the very small fraction of  regional movers, sug- 
gests that regional migration does little to offset regional differences in la- 
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Notes: The employment-population change for stayers is the year-on-year change in the re- 
gional employment-population ratio for those who stay in their region. The employment- 
population  change  for movers  is  the  year-on-year  change  in  the  regional  employment- 
population ratio for those who move regions. 
Change in regional male employment-population  ratios for movers 
positive when the labor market is doing well (the late 197Os, the late 198Os, 
and the late 1990s). In recessions the gap is small, even negative. It seems 
to be easier to move regions for economic reasons when the economy is 
booming than when it is in recession. 
Figure 9.9 examines whether there is any difference in this pattern for 
different education groups. It plots the difference in the change in the em- 
ployment-population  ratio  for movers and  stayers by  education. There 
seems to be a tendency for the more educated movers to have bigger “gains,” 
on average, than the less educated, but the gains for the less educated seem 
more cyclical. It is striking that through much of the 1990s less-educated 
regional movers actually seem to be moving into low-employment regions. 
It is natural to see the difference in regional mobility rates by education 
as the main reason for why the graduate labor market is more integrated 
than that for less-educated workers. And an understanding of this differ- 
ence might help us to think about how mobility for less-educated workers 
might be improved. There are a number of hypotheses: 
1.  The incentives for migration are highest for better-educated workers. 
2.  A major factor in determining choice of college among British stu- 
dents often seems to be the desire to escape from the parental home. 
This act of breaking away from the region in which one was brought 
up may make mobility easier later in life. 
3. Recruitment for graduate jobs is often done at the national level with 
advertisements in the national press and magazines, whereas vacan- 384  Paul Gregg, Stephen Machin, and Alan Manning 
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Fig. 9.9  Differences in the change in regional male employment-population  ratios 
for movers and stayers, by education 
cies in low-level  jobs are typically placed in local job centers or the lo- 
cal press. This makes it hard to search for low-skilled jobs in regions 
where one is not living. 
4.  A higher fraction of less-educated individuals live in social housing, 
which has often been argued to discourage mobility (see Hughes and 
McCormick 1981). 
9.3  The Economic Returns to Migration 
It may be that the economic incentives for migration are higher for bet- 
ter-educated workers. Consider the following simple model for determin- 
ing the economic incentives for migration. In any region, r, there will be a 
probability of employment, e,; a real wage if in employment v;  and a level 
of real benefits, Br,  if unemployed. Expected utility in region r, y,  will then 
be given by 
(1)  T = U(B>  + eMW  - f7(B)I, 
if the utility function is given by  U(.).  Given that housing benefit largely 
insulates the unemployed from variations in the cost of housing, it is prob- 
ably not a bad approximation to assume that B, does not vary across re- 
gions. Suppose we compare expected income in a potential region for mi- 
gration with the home region (denoted by subscript h).  We will have 
(2) 
The economic incentives for migration will be higher, the higher the right- 
hand side of equation (2). There may be a return to migration because of 
I:-  r, = e,[U(Jv  -  U(Y)I + (e, -  e,>U[(&) - w91. Mobility and Joblessness  385 
regional differences in real wages or regional differences in employment 
rates. The importance of the latter depends on the gap between living stan- 
dards when in and out of employment. The earlier discussion on regional 
wage inequalities suggested that, to a first approximation, there are only 
small differences in real regional wages so that it is the difference in em- 
ployment prospects that provides the main motivation for migration in the 
United Kingdom. As we saw in figure 9.1, there are larger regional differ- 
ences in employment rates among the less-skilled that, other things being 
equal, should mean that the incentive to migrate is higher for these work- 
ers. However, it is also true that the return to being in work [U(  W)  -  U(B)] 
is smaller for this group, and this tends to reduce the incentives to migrate. 
Evaluating which effect is larger is a bit tricky as assumptions about the 
different employment prospects and about the marginal utility of income 
in different regions are needed. But let us make some back-of-the-envelope 
calculations using the average employment rate in different regions and as- 
suming utility is given by the log of income. The gap in employment rates 
between the best and worst regions is about 0.10 for graduates and 0.25 for 
those without qualifications. The earnings gap between these two groups is 
approximately 50 log points. Using these numbers we will have that the re- 
turn to migration for graduates is larger if 
(3)  0.10x[0.5 -  ln(R)] > -0.25~  ln(R) a  ln(R) > -0.33  a  R >  0.72, 
where R is the replacement ratio (BIW)  for those without qualifications. 
The replacement ratio in the United Kingdom is normally thought to be 
below this level although it is sensitive to the treatment of housing costs. 
But this suggests that it is certainly not obvious that the economic returns 
to migration are highest for the more educated, and it is quite possible that 
the opposite is true. An explanation for the low rates of regional migration 
for the less educated should probably focus on the costs of migration rather 
than the returns. 
9.4  Graduates and the Move Away from Home 
In the United Kingdom, young people often move away from home 
when they go to college. For students studying full-time for a first degree in 
1998-1999, just over half of the students were studying in a region that is 
not in the region where their parents live. The regional mobility among stu- 
dents going to college far exceeds levels of regional mobility found for any 
other group in the U.K. economy at any other point in the life cycle. One 
hypothesis for why the graduate labor market is more integrated is that the 
break with the parental region at age eighteen makes it easier to move re- 
gions later in life: If the individual has broken the ties of family and friends 
once, it may be easier to do  it again. 
There is some evidence for this if we look at the region in which under- 386  Paul Gregg, Stephen Machin, and Alan Manning 
Table 9.3  The Regional Destination of the First Jobs of Graduates 
Study in Parental  Do Not Study in Parental 
Region (“h)  Region (oh) 
Percent  Percent Who  First Job in  First Job  First Job in  First Job  First Job 
of  Study in  Parental  in Other  Parental  in Study  in Other 










































































25  32 
27  34 
18  16 
31  32 
25  28 
35  29 
28  37 
25  29 
31  30 
31  35 
25  30 
28  31 
Note: These data come from HEFCE and relate to full-time first-degree students registered in 1998- 
1999. 
graduates get their first job. Table 9.3 presents some statistics by parental 
region on the percentage of students who move away to college, on the per- 
centage of first jobs in the parental region for those who studied in the 
parental region, and on the percentage of first jobs in the parental region 
and region of study for those who went away to college.’ A number of 
points are worth noting. First, a much higher fraction of students who 
study in the parental region also get their first job in that region. Second, 
for those students who moved regions to go to college, the parental region 
still has some pulling power when it comes to getting jobs and so does the 
region in which they studied. But a higher fraction take their third job in a 
region other than the one in which they studied or lived as a child than do 
those who studied in the parental region. In the absence of further infor- 
mation, the interpretation of these statistics is problematic as it is likely that 
it is those children with an outward-looking mentality who go away to col- 
lege and are then prepared to consider jobs in a wider range of regions. But 
they are consistent with the idea that breaking away from the parental 
home to go to college also makes it easier to move regions later in life. Fig- 
ures from the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) suggest that this is 
not a recent phenomenon: In the adult population as a whole, only 12  per- 
7. We are grateful to Abigail McKnight for providing us with these figures from the Higher 
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cent of graduates live in the local authority where they were born, com- 
pared to 44 percent among the rest of the population. It is perhaps worth 
noting that more college students are likely to live at home in the future as 
they now have to bear a higher fraction of their costs of tuition, and this 
may act to reduce regional mobility among graduates in the future. 
9.5  Unemployment, Housing Tenure, and Residential Mobility 
We have already seen evidence that, on average, the better educated are 
more likely to move regions. But figure 9.6 does not control for any other 
relevant factors, and we might want to know whether this remains the case 
even once one controls for other factors. Two of the most relevant factors 
are probably labor market status and housing tenure. 
There is considerable research on the factors associated with residential 
and regional  mobility in  the United  Kingdom (e.g., Hughes  and Mc- 
Cormick 1981,1985,1987; Pissarides and Wadsworth 1989; Jackman and 
Savouri 1992; Henley 1998; Boheim and Taylor 2000), much of which fo- 
cuses on questions like “are the unemployed more likely to move?” The re- 
search on the relationship between residence and economic fortunes is 
plagued by an inability to separate causality. For example, it is almost cer- 
tainly true that residence is likely to change when there are changes in cir- 
cumstances: changes in household structure (leaving the parental home, 
marriage, divorce, birth of a child, etc.) or changes in labor market out- 
comes (getting a job, losing a job, getting a promotion, etc.). We might 
expect that both “good” and “bad” shocks are related to changes in resi- 
dence. On the other hand there is the feeling that residence (primarily 
location) determines economic opportunity and hence that changes in res- 
idence affect changes in economic opportunity. 
Existing research is very poor at disentangling the direction of causality. 
To do it properly, researchers would seem to need some good instruments, 
but those are hard to find. In the absence of good instruments, we are go- 
ing to describe the correlations in the data and offer an interpretation. 
We use two data sets to investigate the determinants of mobility: the 
BHPS and the LFS. Boheim and Taylor (2000) have recently presented 
an analysis of residential mobility using the BHPS, and we will follow on 
from their research. Unlike them, we split the sample into those who are in 
couples for whom household mobility is likely to be most important (see 
Mincer 1978) and those who are not in couples for whom individual char- 
acteristics are likely to be most important. 
In table 9.4 and table 9.5 we report basic residential and regional mobil- 
ity equations  for  the BHPS for individuals and couples,  respectively.* 
8. The BHPS also asks questions about mobility across local authority district, but these 
are not shown here as the results were very similar. Table 9.4  Mobility Equations for Individuals: BHPS 
Regional 
Residential  Regional 
(entire sample)  (entire sample)  New  Social 
Job = 1  Housing  Resp = 0 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Housina Characteristics (base category: owner occupier with mortgage) 
I 
Own house outright 
Social housing tenant 
Private unfurnished tenant 
Private furnished tenant 









ISCED 0- 1 
ISCED 2 
ISCED 5-7 
No. of observations 
Pseudo-R2 




















































Labor Force Status (base category: employed) 
,019  ,012  ,012  ,007  -.013 
(.014)  (.014)  (.006)  (.006)  (.014) 
,067  ,073  ,038  ,046 
(.057)  (.059)  (.037)  (.040) 
,020  ,026  ,013  ,018  ,015 
(.017)  (.018)  (.008)  (.009)  (.033) 
,051  ,055  ,043  ,048  ,030 
(.017)  (.015)  (.008)  (.009)  (.018) 
,016  .022  ,009  ,014  ,039 
(.025)  (.026)  (.014)  (.015)  (.078) 
,051  ,031 
(.011)  (.005) 
,061  ,057 
(.020)  (.013) 
Education (base category: ISCED 3) 
-.0245  -.0227  -.0148  .0133  -.0390 
(.0136)  (.0135)  (.0042)  (.0038)  (.0173) 
-.0254  -.0239  -.0125  -.0110  -.0322 
(.0093)  (.0093)  (.0032)  (.0030)  (.0125) 
,0139  .0129  ,0114  .0103  ,0124 
(.0127)  (.0126)  (.OOSO)  (.0047)  (.0176) 
11,063  11,063  11,063  11,063  1,783 
,150  0.153  ,0169  0.190  0.186 





















































Notes: Coefficients are marginal effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust and corrected for 
clustering on the individual. Other controls are age, education, nonwhite, child of household head, lone 
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Table 9.5  Mobility Equations for Couples: BHPS 
Residential  Regional  Regional 
(entire sample)  (entire sample)  ~ 
~  New Jobs >  0  Social Housing 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Housing Characteristics (base category: owner occupier with mortgage) 
Own house outright  ,010  ,009  -.001  -.002  -0.000 
(.008)  (.008)  (.002)  (.002)  (0.010) 
Social housing tenant  .038  ,033  -.OOO  -.001  .002 
(.008)  (.008)  (.003)  (.002)  (.010) 
Private unfurnished tenant  ,146  ,141  .016  ,012  ,002 




No. of new jobs 








(.018)  (.017)  (.506)  (.005)  .010) 
,328  .323  ,032  ,026  ,063 
(.032)  (0.31)  (.011)  i.010)  (.027) 
Labour Force Status (base category: employed) 
,018  .024 
(.009)  (.009) 
.OOl  .001 





,001  ,003 
(.003)  (.003) 
-.ooo  -.ooo 





Education (base category: ISCED 3) 
-.0189  -.0191  -.0064  -.0057 
(.0058)  (.0056)  (.0018)  (.0014) 
-.0088  -.0085  -.0046  -.0040 
(.0047)  i.0046)  (.0017)  (.0014) 
,0039  ,0031  ,0064  ,0047 
(.0057)  (.0056)  (.0026)  (.0022) 
14,090  14,090  14,090  14,090 
0.126  0.132  0.102  0.151 

































____~  ~ 
Note: See table 9.4. 
Tables 9.6 and 9.7 report similar equations for the LFS where we can look 
at changes over longer periods and have larger sample sizes but with the 
disadvantage that we have a narrower range of covariates (notably, we do 
not have initial housing tenure except in a few years). We report only the 
coefficients on the variables in which we are interested, namely initial labor 
market status, housing tenure, and education: The other controls are listed. 
Younger workers  are more likely to move,  and ethnic minorities  and 
households with school-age children are less likely to move. Table 9.6  Mobility Equations for Individuals: LFS 
Regional 
ISCED 0-1  ISCED 2  ISCED 3  ISCED 4  New Job = 1 
Residential (entire sample) 


















ISCED 0-1  -.0075 
(.0011) 
ISCED 2  -.0094 
(.0011) 
ISCED 5-7  ,0138 
(.0013) 
No. of observations  555,450 
Pseudo-  R2  ,184 
Mean of the dependent variable  ,107 
Labor Force Status (base  category: employed) 
,0302  ,0061  ,0035  .0037 
(.0016)  (.0007)  (.0006)  (.0006) 
.O 132  ,0058  ,0097  ,0096 
(.0055)  (.0025)  (.0028)  (.0031) 
.o 154  ,0019  ,0056  ,0037 
(.0015)  (.0006)  (.0007)  (.0006) 
,0785  ,0296  ,0262  .009  1 
(.0022)  (.0011)  (.0010)  (.0023) 
,0579  ,0078  .0111  ,0066 
(.0024)  (.0010)  (.0011)  (.OOOP) 
,0420  ,0228  ,0137 
(.0013)  (.0007)  (.0009) 
,0855  .0369  ,0228 
(.0024)  (.0014)  (.0016) 
Education (base category: ISCED 3) 
-.0087  -.0066  -.0065 
(.0011)  (.0004)  (.0003) 
-.0098  -.0043  -.0042 
(.0010)  (.0003)  (.0003) 
,0129  ,0101  ,0078 
(.0013)  (.0006)  (.0005) 
555,450  555,450  555,450  245,643 
,192  ,172  ,202  ,100 







































































~  ~  ~  -~~~ 
Nore  Other controls are gender, dge dummies, nonwhite, foreign-born, lone parent, number of kids, child of head of household, other relative of head of house- 
hold, region, and year dummies Table 9.7  Mobility Equations for Couples: LFS 
Residential  Regional  Regional 
(entire sample)  (entire sample) 
ISCED 0-1  ISCED 2  ISCED 3  ISCED 4  New Jobs >  0 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Workless 
Dual 
No. of new jobs 




No. of observations 
Pseudo-  R2 














Labor Force Status (base category: single  earner) 
,033  .0022  ,003  1  ,0032  ,0026 
(.002)  (.0009)  (.0009)  i.0010)  (.0016) 
-.013  -.0067  -.0054  -.0019  -.0045 
(.001)  (.OOOS)  (.0004)  (.0006)  i.0006) 
,035  ,0125  .0084  .0011 
i.001)  (.0003)  (.0004)  i.0004) 
,045  ,0148  .0102  .0128 










Education (base category: ISCED 3) 
-.0051  -.0048 
(.0005)  (.0004) 
-.0021  -.0021 
(.0012)  (.0005) 
,0095  ,0081 
(.OOOS)  (.0007) 
294,938  294,938  95,750  77,754 
,065  ,110  ,095  ,097 




































Notes: Coefficients are marginal effects. Other controls are age and age squared of man and woman, nonwhite, foreign-born, number and age of dependent chil- 
dren, child of household head, region, and year dummies. 392  Paul Gregg, Stephen Machin, and Alan Manning 
9.6  Unemployment and Residential Mobility 
One of the main methods of adjustment to regional shocks envisaged by 
economists is that workers without work in depressed regions are moti- 
vated to move to look for work in other regions where the employment pos- 
sibilities are better. It might be necessary to physically move to the new lo- 
cation to look for work there, or it might be possible to search for work in 
one part of the country from another part and only move when work is ob- 
tained. In this section, we will argue that speculative moves to  find work are 
very rare in the United Kingdom and that the most common pattern of mo- 
bility is that first a job is obtained and then a residential move follows. 
For individuals the unemployed  are more likely to move both regions 
and residence, although the coefficient in the residential mobility equation 
is not significantly different from zero for the BHPS. This is in line with 
other studies: As McCormick (1997, 587) summarizes it, “all UK studies 
which examine the effect of individual unemployment  . . . find this has a 
strong positive effect on out-migration.’’ The implication often drawn is 
that those who lack work are spurred by this to change location in search 
of better economic opportunities. But these regressions do  not justify such 
a conclusion as they do  not identify the reason for the move. It is worth not- 
ing that other labor force states are also associated with effects on moving 
that are often as large as the impact of unemployment: for example, retire- 
ment. Yet such moves are unlikely to be motivated by the search for work. 
Being a full-time student is associated with a very high marginal effect on 
mobility, presumably because of the impact that being a college student has 
on leaving the parental home and moving regions. 
One can also see very clearly the link between changes in employment 
status and residential moves by including in a residential mobility equation 
a dummy variable for whether an individual has a new job  or has lost a job.9 
For an individual who was initially  unemployed  the variable “new job” 
takes the value 1 if they now have a job, while for those who were initially 
employed it takes the value  1 if they have changed jobs. Unsurprisingly, 
both these variables are incredibly significant when included in residential 
mobility equations. The importance of the “lost job” variable also indi- 
cates that residential mobility may be associated with bad as well as good 
shocks to the individual’s labor market fortunes. The inclusion of the “got 
job” and “lost job” variables reduces the marginal effect of unemployment 
for individuals in both the BHPS and the LFS, although it raises the rnar- 
ginal effect of the workless household variable for couples. However, if we 
9. Boheim and Taylor (2000) do examine the relationship between job changes and rcsi- 
dential moves but use a bivariate probit model to do  so. It is not clear that this is the best way 
of modeling the interactions, as it is best suited to the situation where unobserved character- 
istics are correlated with both outcomes rather than a case where the two outcomes them- 
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restrict the sample to those who have gotten a job, the unemployed (or 
workless) are less likely to have moved regions than those in work (column 
[5] of tables 9.4 and 9.5 and column [9] of tables 9.6 and 9.7). 
Of the 2.4 percent of those unemployed a year ago who move, 47 percent 
are now in employment, 41 percent are unemployed, and 12 percent are in- 
active. This compares to 31 percent, 55 percent, and 14 percent for those 
who do not move. This could be interpreted as showing that regional mo- 
bility is very successful in getting the unemployed jobs. But one can inter- 
pret the data in two ways. Either the unemployed move house first and then 
find a job, or they find a job first and then seek to move house if the com- 
mute is too inconvenient given their present location. The policy implica- 
tions of the two views are rather different, as it may not be policies that 
make residential mobility easier that are needed but policies to make it eas- 
ier for workers in one area to find work elsewhere. 
Ideally, one would like data on when jobs were obtained to compare with 
the date of residential mobility, but we typically only have data on when 
jobs were started that is more likely to postdate residential mobility. There 
are a number of ways in which we can try to get some idea of the likely se- 
quence of events. 
Since 1996  the LFS asks specific information about the month of a resi- 
dential move and the month in which the job started. If the unemployed 
move regions and then find work, we would expect to see a time lag be- 
tween the change in residence and getting a job. In fact, the average time 
lag is 0.9 months. If the unemployed engage in speculative moves to look 
for work, this implies implausibly short durations of unemployment in the 
destination region. And the time lag is actually shorter than for those who 
have had a job-to-job move (so have no intervening period of unemploy- 
ment) and moved regions (their time lag is one month). It is possible that 
the unemployed first move to a new region, stay with friends or family, and 
only move residence when they got a job. But average residential tenure 
among regional movers is identical for the previously unemployed and  job- 
to-job movers (5.8 months). So this does not seem very persuasive. All of 
this evidence is very circumstantial, but it does suggest a picture in which 
it is rare for the unemployed to move regions without first having found 
themselves a job. 
This evidence does not answer the question about the motivation for 
unemployed regional movers who do not make the transition into employ- 
ment. The BHPS does contain information on the motivation for residen- 
tial moves. In particular it asks whether the reason for a move was job- 
related, and, if so, the respondent is asked to elaborate. Table 9.8 tabulates 
the responses. Only 12 percent of residential moves are reported to be mo- 
tivated by employment reasons, although this rises to 31 percent among 
regional  movers.  Employment-related  reasons  are  less  often  given  by 
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Table 9.8  Reasons for Residential Mobility: BHPS 
Nonemploycd 
Residential  Regional  Nonemployed  Regional 
Movers  Movers  Movers  Movers 
Moved for employment reasons 
Employer relocated 
New job, same employer 
New job, new employer 
Closer to same job 
Starthelocate own business 
Salary increase-new  home 
To seek work 
Other 
Notes: Sample sizes are reported in parentheses. The second and subsequent rows give the 
percentages of those who said they had moved for employment reasons who gave more spe- 
cific answers when requested to elaborate on this. 
related reasons are given, a very small fraction report that they were moti- 
vated by seeking work: Reasons that imply that the job came first and mo- 
bility subsequently are much more important. The bottom line would be 
that of the 2 percent of the nonemployed who move regions, 25 percent are 
motivated by job-related reasons, and, of those, 25 percent are motivated 
by the desire to seek work. It is hard to escape the conclusion that specu- 
lative regional mobility by the unemployed is very rare. 
This evidence is not perfect, but it does suggest that it is important to ob- 
tain a job before moving and that it is very unlikely for the unemployed to 
move location without having a job."' This is not that surprising. It is not 
very easy to change location if there is no source of income. Banks and 
building societies are likely to be reluctant to give mortgages to those with- 
out work, even if one already has one. And private landlords are also likely 
to regard these people as bad risks as prospective tenants. This problem 
does not seem to be unique to the United Kingdom: The ethnographic ac- 
count of Ehrenreich (2001) about life as a low-wage worker in the United 
10. It is quite likely that the unemployed who move regions initially stay with friends and 
family in the destination region. The finding that immigrants in the United States tend to go 
where immigrants from their home country already are is consistent with this. It suggests that 
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States is full of the difficulties caused by  finding accommodation when 
moving to a new city. 
This also suggests that one of the problems faced by the less educated in 
moving regions is the difficulty they have in searching for work in another 
region as a result of the lack of regional integration of the vacancy system. 
Tables 9.6 and 9.7 estimate separate mobility equations by education for 
LFS individuals and couples. The marginal effects of the “got job” and 
“lost job” variables are much larger for the more educated. 
But why are vacancies for less-skilled jobs predominantly advertised at 
local level? It could be that there is no point in advertising in Scotland for 
an  unskilled job  in the Southeast because none of the unskilled in Scotland 
will be interested in taking that job. However, our earlier analysis suggests 
that the economic returns to  job mobility may be higher for the less skilled. 
Perhaps more plausible is the argument that, when unemployment is high, 
there is a ready supply of less-skilled workers in all localities. There is no 
point in advertising for workers in distant regions if  there is an excess 
supply locally. But the consequence of this policy for each individual em- 
ployer is to trap some workers in high-unemployment regions and to shut 
off the route by which less-skilled workers can migrate from high- to low- 
unemployment regions. 
If this hypothesis is correct, we might expect to see more attempts by 
employers to recruit less-skilled workers from further afield as labor mar- 
kets tighten. This can then explain why the migration from high- to low- 
unemployment regions seems greater in booms than recessions as we saw 
in figure 9.8. Perhaps the most celebrated and extreme example of this was 
the process of recruitment of workers in the West Indies by London Trans- 
port when faced with a recruitment crisis in the 1950s and 1960s. Booms 
increase the supply of vacancies overall and the fraction of vacancies for 
jobs in other regions, so booms grease the wheels of migration. 
One other possible explanation for the lack of speculative moves by the 
unemployed is that the structure of the housing market makes this difficult. 
There is some evidence for such frustrated residential mobility. Using data 
from the BHPS, those in social and private rented housing are more likely 
to want to move and particularly likely to continue to want to move, even 
if they have just done so. Let us move on to consider the role of the hous- 
ing market in more detail. 
9.7  Housing Tenure and Residential Mobility 
The housing market plays a very important part in determining where 
people live and hence has a potentially large impact on both regional and 
neighborhood inequalities. And the housing market has also seen some of 
the most dramatic changes in the United Kingdom in the last twenty years. 
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owner-occupiers,  32  percent  were in social housing (provided by  local 
councils or nonprofit housing associations), and 10 percent were private 
rented tenants. By  1999,75 percent were owner-occupiers, 16 percent were 
in social housing, and 9 percent were private rented tenants. The main rea- 
son for this transformation was the “right-to-buy’’ policy introduced by 
Margaret Thatcher in the 1980 Housing Act that gave council tenants sub- 
sidies to buy their houses. To date, 1.7 million tenants have taken advan- 
tage of this. At the same time, local councils were prevented from using the 
proceeds to build new houses: Whereas councils had completed  145,000 
new homes in 1977 (46 percent of the total), by 1995  this had fallen to 2,000 
(1 percent of the total). 
Those who remained in social housing had their rents raised in the early 
198Os, although they remain well below market rents (30-40 percent below, 
according to most estimates). The impact of this was mitigated in part by 
the system of welfare support for tenants (called Housing Benefit after 
1982), which paid 100 percent of rents subject to a means-test and a num- 
ber of restrictions on the maximum allowable rent. In theory the U.K. sys- 
tem of housing benefit should make regional mobility easier as it may pay 
all the housing costs of those who are unemployed. However, the system is 
notorious for the inefficiency of its administration, and a recent survey 
(United Kingdom, Department of the Environment, Transport, and Re- 
gions 1999) found that only 1 percent of landlords had a positive prefer- 
ence for tenants on housing benefit, while 18 percent had an aversion to 
tenants on housing benefit. The two most common problems with tenants 
on housing benefit cited were problems with administration of housing be- 
nefit and rent arrears (which are also likely to be related to administrative 
problems). 
For private tenants in receipt of housing benefit, the deregulation of 
rents meant, in theory, that any rent could be charged by the landlord and 
paid for in full by the state.” Expenditure on housing benefit for private 
tenants rose dramatically, and steps were introduced in the mid- 1990s to 
limit the payment of housing benefit to individuals, first to the under- 
twenty-five-year-olds (who are restricted to an amount that is paid for a 
room in a shared house) and then to others. Reform of housing benefit re- 
mains on the agenda, and a number of options for reform are discussed in 
the April 2000 green paper “Quality and Choice: A Decent Home for All” 
(United Kingdom, Department of the Environment, Transport, and Re- 
gions 2000). 
For owner-occupiers, the main government policy has been the steady 
11. One still sees the statement “no DSS [Department for Social Security]” in many ads for 
rental properties, even ones that are quite expensive, for example, El000 per month. What is 
surprising is that anyone on welfare benefits could even consider living in such accommo- 
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restriction  and eventual withdrawal  of  the mortgage  interest  relief  at 
source (MIRAS) scheme by which interest payments were tax-deductible. 
For those owner-occupiers out of work, mortgage interest payments could 
be covered by welfare benefits. In the mid- 1990s these were restricted in the 
amount and a nine-month waiting period was introduced before owner- 
occupiers would have their mortgage covered by a welfare payment. Per- 
haps more important than changing government policy was financial mar- 
ket liberalization in the 1980s, which made it easier to get a mortgage. 
Let us consider the impact of  housing tenure on residential mobility. 
Relative to the base category of owner-occupiers with a mortgage, those in 
social housing are more likely to move residence but less likely to move re- 
gions, and those in private rented housing are much more likely to move 
both residence and regions, with those in furnished rental properties the 
most mobile by a large factor. 
There are a number of possible reasons for why those in social housing 
might be less likely to move regions. One is that such housing remains heav- 
ily subsidized, and it is very difficult to move into equivalent subsidized 
housing in another local authority because the properties are generally al- 
located using a procedure that gives a very high weight to residence in the 
local authority. One can see this in the data-only  14 percent of new let- 
tings in social housing are movers from another region, compared to 37 
percent of new private-sector lettings. 
There are a number of ways to test this hypothesis. One is to try to esti- 
mate the size of the subsidy (which differs across local authorities) and then 
see whether this is related to mobility. Column (6) of tables 9.4 and 9.5 does 
this without much success. 
Another hypothesis is that it is simply the characteristics of those in so- 
cial housing that make the difference. One way of looking at this is to con- 
sider those who are not responsible for the housing costs in their residence 
(mostly children of the head of household). For this group we still see the 
same pattern of housing tenure effects (see column [7] of table 9.4) as in the 
full sample, suggesting that housing costs may have little to do with the 
housing tenure effects. 
9.8  Neighborhood Inequalities: Is Britain Ghettoizing? 
The previous discussion has all been about interregional dispersion. But 
the regions are very aggregated and hide enormous differences within re- 
gions. In this section we examine the distribution of employment and un- 
employment at the most disaggregated level available for the United King- 
dom: enumeration districts (which average about 375 residents). Data at 
this level of disaggregation are only available from the decennial censuses, 
so we only have 1981 and 1991 to work with. Although this is rather dated, 398  Paul Gregg, Stephen Machin, and Alan Manning 
this does cover a period of considerable change and turbulence in the U.K. 
labor market in which overall wage inequality rose substantially (see Gos- 
ling and Lemieux 2001). Unfortunately, the U.K. census contains no in- 
come information, so this discussion will focus on employment-related out- 
comes only. 
The male unemployment rate was 1 1.7 percent in 198 I and 1  1.3 percent 
in 1991. The absence of any dramatic change in the level of unemployment 
makes it easier to consider changes in the distribution of unemployment 
across neighborhoods, although it should be borne in mind that the re- 
gional distribution of unemployment was rather different in the two years, 
with unemployment being relatively higher in the south in 1991. 
Panel A of figure 9.10 shows the male unemployment rates by neigh- 
bourhood from the lowest to the highest in 1981 and 1991 (this is just the 
cumulative density function for the unemployment rate). As can be seen, 
the two lines are extremely similar, indicating that there is  rather little 
change: The unemployment rate at the 10th percentile is about 4.5 percent, 
while it is 20 percent at the 90th percentile. As the lines are so similar, panel 
B of figure 9.10 presents the change in the unemployment rate at each per- 
centile. The magnitudes of the changes are very small, although there 
seems to be some tendency for the best and worst areas to worsen, while 
those in the middle do slightly better. 
Given the rise in male inactivity rates in this period, it is also worth con- 
sidering changes in male employment-population ratios. Panels C and D 
of figure 9.10 do a similar exercise as the previous one for nonemployment 
rates. Unfortunately, it does not seem possible to compute the nonemploy- 
ment rate for working-age men in  1981, so this is based on all men aged 
sixteen or over.I2  There is a rise in the male nonemployment rate over this 
period (see panel C of figure 9.10), and this is largest in absolute terms in 
the worst enumeration districts (see panel D of figure 9.10). However, in 
proportional terms there is no very dramatic change in the nonemploy- 
ment rate at different percentiles. 
It is also worth considering women as their employment trends were 
rather different over this period. Panels E-H  of figure 9.10 show similar 
pictures for the unemployment  and nonemployment  rates  for women. 
Both their unemployment and nonemployment rates were lower in 1991 
than 198  1. The fall in unemployment rates is larger in the worst areas, but 
the fall in nonemployment rates was less. 
The analysis so far has made no attempt to match enumeration districts 
in 1981 and 1991 so that it cannot answer questions about the types of areas 
that had big changes in employment. Because of boundary changes, it is 
not always possible to match enumeration districts across the two censuses, 
12. For 1991 the correlation across enumeration districts of the employment-population ra- 
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Fig. 9.10  A, The distribution of male unemployment rates, 1981 and 1991; B, the 
change in male unemployment rates at  different percentiles, 1981-1991;  C, the dis- 
tribution of male nonemployment rates, 1981  and 1991; D,  the change in male non- 
employment rates at  different percentiles, 1981-1991 ;  E, the distribution of female 
unemployment rates, 1981 and 1991; F, the change in female unemployment rates 
at  different percentiles, 1981-1991; C, the distribution of female nonemployment 
rates, 1981  and 1991; H, the change in female nonemployment rates at  different 
percentiles,  1981-1991 I 
IIIIIIIII 







-.05  - 
-.l  - 
1, 
0  .I  .2  .3  .4  .5  .6  .7  .8  .9  1 
popshare 
Fig. 9.10  (cont.)  A, The distribution of male unemployment rates, 1981 and 1991; 
B, the change in male unemployment rates at  different percentiles, 1981-1991;  C, 
the distribution of male nonemployment rates, 1981 and 1991; D, the change in male 
nonemployment rates at  different percentiles, 1981-1991;  E, the distribution of 
female unemployment rates, 1981 and 1991; F, the change in female unemployment 
rates at different percentiles, 1981-1991;  C,  the distribution of female nonemploy- 
ment rates, 1981 and 1991; H,  the change in female nonemployment rates at 




0  .1  .2  .3  .4  .5  .6  .7  .8  .9  1 
popshare 
Fig. 9.10  (cont.) C, the distribution of female nonemployment  rates, 1981 
and 1991; H, the change in female nonemployment  rates at different percentiles, 
1981-1991 
but this can be done for about 7,400 of them. Table 9.9 investigates the de- 
terminants of the change in unemployment and nonemployment rates on 
a variety of initial characteristics about its inhabitants in 1981. The vari- 
ables included are limited by data availability but include the tenure distri- 
bution of the housing stock and the social class of heads of households. As 
can be seen, once geographical controls (here, parliamentary constituen- 
cies) are introduced, there is no evidence that those areas with more house- 
holds from the lower social classes in 1981 fared less well over the ten-year 
period 1981-1991. 
Figure 9.11 looks at whether there has been any increased polarization 
in area crime rates. This is based on data from the British Crime Surveys 
(BCS) of 1984 and 1996, which contain data on crime victimization at the 
household level in the year preceding the survey. The figure plots 1983 to 
1995 changes in area crime rates at different percentiles for around 600 
areas in the 1984 survey and 800 areas in the 1996 survey. It shows some Table 9.9  Changes in Unemployment and Nonemployment Rates by Wards, 1981-1991 
Males  Females 
1981 Area  Unemployment  Nonemployment  Unemployment  Nonemployment 
Characteristics  Rate  Rate  Ratc  Rate 
Proportion in: 
LA  ,036  ,014  ,063  ,055  .O 17  -.016  .  I00  ,099 
(.002)  (.002)  (.003)  (.003)  (.002)  (.003)  (.003)  (.003) 
Private rented  ,087  -.006  -.048  -.I  10  ,090  ,002  ,034  ,019 
(.006)  (.006)  (.007)  (.008)  (.006)  (.007)  (.007)  (.008) 
HA  ,084  ,035  .I02  ,064  ,059  -.009  ,120  .079 
(.011)  (.009)  (.013)  (.012)  (.011)  (.010)  (.013)  (.013) 
(.010)  (.009)  (.012)  (.012)  (.011)  (.010)  (.013)  (.013) 
Nonpermanent  -.043  -.047  -.008  .022  -.056  -.044  -.039  .036 
(.020)  (.015)  (.023)  (.020)  (.022)  (.018)  (.023)  (.022) 
Social class I  ,049  -.001  ,063  .079  ,139  ,046  ,048  ,053 
(.014)  (.011)  (.016)  (.015)  (.015)  (.013)  (.016)  (.016) 
(.011)  (.009)  (.013)  (.012)  (.012)  (.010)  (.013)  (.013) 
(.011)  (.009)  (.014)  (.013)  (.012)  (.011)  (.014)  (.013) 
(.013)  (.010)  (.016)  (.014)  (.014)  (.012)  (.016)  (.015) 
Job-related rent  p.028  ,024  -.005  .058  -.142  -.OX3  p.260  -.115 
Social class I1  .038  -.006  ,025  ,047  ,123  ,045  -.051  p.014 
Social class 111  .047  ~  ,004  ,044  ,038  ,083  ,024  -.070  ,005 
Social class IV  ,017  ,004  ,029  .035  ,038  ,022  ,001  ,007 
Constituencycontrols  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  No  No 
No. of observations  7,411  7,417  7,417  7,417  1,411  1,417  1,417  7,417 
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Source: Calculated from the 1984 and 1996 BCSs. 
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evidence of increased crime at the higher percentiles, although most of the 
profile after the median is fairly flat (with crime rates about 0.3 higher in 
1995 as compared to 1983), except right at the top of the distribution. 
This section has shown that the United Kingdom does have big inequal- 
ities between neighborhoods but that it has always had them, and there do 
not seem to be any very clear trends in the period 1981-1991. 
9.9  Council House Sales 
The most dramatic change in the U.K. housing market in the last twenty 
years has been the sale of council houses to private individuals following 
on from the 1980 Housing Act. Something like one-third of council houses 
were sold in the following ten years. The April 2000 green paper “Quality 
and Choice: A Decent Home for All” claimed that “right to buy sales have 
helped foster mixed-income communities by keeping more affluent house- 
holds in the same areas” (United Kingdom, Department of the Environ- 
ment, Transport, and Regions 2000,55). But it is not immediately obvious 
that this is the case. If council houses had been sold at random, then mixed 
communities would  have been  likely to result. But if, as is  sometimes 
claimed, council houses were only sold in the “nicer” areas and virtually 
none were sold on the worst estates, then the mixed communities would 
disappear, and we would end up with a situation in which neighborhoods 
were either all council or all owner-occupied. The best data set for looking 
at these effects is the census, as the bulk of council house sales were con- 
centrated in the period 1981-1991. 
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Fig. 9.12  How council house sales varied by neighborhoods, 1981-1995 404  Paul Gregg, Stephen Machin, and Alan Manning 
in an enumeration district against the proportion council house tenants in 
198  1. There is some evidence that the sales in council housing were smaller 
in the neighborhoods with the highest  initial concentrations of council 
housing. But the effect is very modest, and 20 percent of council houses are 
still being sold in the most concentrated estates. The consequence is that, 
whereas in 1981, 1.1 percent of neighborhoods were 100 percent council 
and 8.3 percent were more than 95 percent, this had fallen to 0.2 percent 
and 1.2 percent, respectively, by 1991. 
However, these statistics do not tell us anything about the people living 
in the houses that had been council. Obviously, when a council house is 
first sold, there is no immediate change in the composition of the neigh- 
borhood. But some types of council tenants were more likely to buy than 
others, and, when these move on, it is the characteristics of the households 
who replace them that are of interest. Some anecdotal accounts suggest 
that excouncil houses have been sold to private landlords who then allow 
the properties to decay, leading to rapid worsening in neighborhoods (see, 
for example, Davies 1998). 
Table 9.10 draws on data from the 1984 LFS, which had an extra sup- 
plement on housing, and on the Survey of English Housing in the 1990s. It 
presents marginal effects derived from probit models of council house pur- 
chased by  people who were previously living in council accommodation 
(i.e., those council tenants who bought the property they lived in). Two 
specifications are reported for each data source, one which includes social 
class measures and one which does not. The pattern of purchase is clear in 
both time periods considered. It is very much the people with access to re- 
sources who were more likely to have bought their council property. For 
example, the probability of purchase is higher for older heads of household 
and is considerably lower in workless households. Furthermore,  it is higher 
for people with from higher-social  class backgrounds.  l3 
However, this evidence cannot tell us anything about how council house 
sales have influenced the social composition of neighborhoods. For that, 
we need to know how the characteristics of those who exercised the right to 
buy their council house differ from those that they subsequently sold to. It 
is hard to get information on this. But we can see whether there is any evi- 
dence that neighborhoods in which a lot of council houses were sold be- 
tween 198  1 and 1991 had any dramatic change in their social composition. 
Table 9.11 presents some evidence on this. It regresses the change in the pro- 
portion of household heads in different social classes on differences in the 
proportions in different housing tenures. Social class I represents the high- 
13.  We do not have education data in the Survey of English Housing, but based on the 1984 
LFS it is also clear that council house purchase was higher for more educated council tenants. 
Adding education variables to the first estimates column of table 9.10 using the ISCED clas- 
sifications considered earlier produced probit marginals (standard errors) of .094 (.026) for 
household heads with ISCED 5-7,  ,061 (.013) for household heads with ISCED 3, and ,026 
(.008) for household heads with ISCED 2, relative to the low-education group ISCED 0-1. Mobility and Joblessness  405 
Table 9.10  Who Bought Their Council House? (probit models, marginal effects, and associated 
standard errors) 
Age of HoH 18-25 
Age of HoH 26-30 
Age of HoH 41-50 
Age of HoH 51-60 
Retired HoH 
Workless household 
Dual earner household 
Male HoH 
Nonwhite HoH 




No. of kids 
Professional HoH 
Intermediate HoH 
Skilled nonmanual HoH 
Skilled manual HoH 
Partly skilled HoH 
No. of households 





-.069  (.003) 
-.035  (.005) 





















-.075  (.006) 
,053 (.007) 





-.006  (.005) 
-.006  (.002) 
14,799  19,627 
Including Social Class 
Labour Force  Survey of 
Survey:  English Housing: 
Buying  Buying since 
1983-1984  1990 
-.068  (.003)  -.042 (.003) 
-.037  (.005)  -.020  (.004) 
.010 (.006)  ,013 (.006) 
.019 (.008)  .041 (.006) 
-.071  (.010)  -.069  (.006) 
,064 (.008)  .051 (.007) 
,011 (.006)  ,015 (.005) 
-.007  (.007)  -.003  (.005) 
-.017  (.010)  -.007  (.006) 
,052 (.011)  ,021 (.006) 
.087 (.012)  .045 (.008) 
,052 (.013)  ,024 (.007) 
.074 (.020)  .057 (.014) 
.I  14 (.049)  .058 (.028) 
,059 (.018)  ,029 (.009) 
.051 (.013)  ,028 (.007) 
,017 (.011)  .013 (.007) 
14,730  19,557 
-.005  (.002)  -.006  (.002) 
.I 14 (.022)  ,055 (.Oil) 
Note: HoH = head of household. 
est social class and social class V the lowest. Because all household heads 
are allocated to one of the social classes, the coefficients in a given row sum 
to zero. Areas with the largest falls in council housing seem to have a larger 
fall in households in the highest social classes. This may be because those 
in the higher social classes were more likely to buy their council houses but 
that they then sold them on to people from lower social classes. However, 
the coefficients are small compared to those on the private rental propor- 
tion where neighborhoods with an increase in the proportion in private 
rental seem to have big increases in the fraction of households from the 
higher social classes. This evidence does not suggest that council house 
sales have transformed the social composition of neighborhoods. 
9.10  Conclusions 
There is little evidence of any dramatic trend in regional inequalities or 
regional mobility in the United Kingdom in the last twenty-five years. This 
is true whether one looks at aggregate regions or very small areas. It is im- 406  Paul Gregg, Stephen Machin, and Alan Manning 
Table 9.1 1  The Effect of Council House Sales on the Social Composition 
of Neighborhoods 
Change in Proportion in Social Class 
Change in Proportion 
of Households  I  I1  111  IV  V 
In LA  ,0149 
(.0086) 
In private rented  ,0660 
(.0217) 
In HA  .03 16 
(.0268) 
In  job-related rent  ,0185 
(.0320) 
In nonpermanent  ,0274 
(.0734) 
No. of observations  7,415 
R'  0.11 
,0298 
(.O 160) 














































Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the proportion of household heads in each so- 
cial class from 1981-1991,  and the right hand side is the change in the proportion of house- 
holds in different housing tenures. The sample are the wards that can be matched in 1981 and 
1991. 
portant to realize how stable the United Kingdom has been over a long pe- 
riod: Table 9.12 presents population shares for the period 1911-1991  and 
the overriding impression (certainly compared to the United States) is how 
little has changed. There has been variation in mobility rates in the past 
twenty years, but it has been more connected with the cycle. Perhaps this is 
not surprising: There are no very dramatic policy changes in this area that 
might have been expected to transform mobility in the United Kingdom. 
The largest change is the sale of council houses, but a realistic assessment 
would suggest that the impact of this change is likely to be very small. 
One of the most striking features of the United Kingdom is that the 
graduate labor market appears to be, to a first approximation, well inte- 
grated (using the United States as a benchmark). Any spatial problems oc- 
cur in the labor market for the less educated. We have suggested a number 
of reasons for why this might be the case. First, the act of going away to col- 
lege might act to sever connections with the region in which one grew up 
and make one more open to the possibility of residential moves. 
Second, we have suggested that speculative moves in search of work by 
the unemployed are extremely rare in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, 
they are likely to remain so, given the costs of moving and the difficulty of 
obtaining accommodation if one is without work. The fact that vacancies 
for  low-skilled work  tend  to be  concentrated  on local  labor  markets, 
whereas those for graduates tends to  be more national, makes it difficult for 
the less skilled to seek work in other regions. High unemployment through- Mobility and Joblessness  407 
Table 9.12  Population Shares, 1911-1991  (YO) 
1911  1961  1998 
North 












Metropolitan areas (excl. London) 














































Total population (thousands)  42,190  52,807  59,237 
out much of this period has also made it unnecessary for employers to seek 
low-skilled workers outside the local labor market. The strong cyclicality 
in regional mobility suggests the overall state of the labor market may also 
be important in easing flows, although, ironically, it is in times of recession 
that commentators get most agitated about regional inequalities. Thus, re- 
gional mobility may improve as labor markets tighten, and there is some 
evidence of increased regional mobility among the less skilled in recent 
years. This process could be helped if technology allowed the creation of a 
national list of vacancies. 
Finally, the housing market may act as a deterrent to moves. Low-skilled 
workers tend to be concentrated in social housing, and tenants in that sec- 
tor have very low rates of regional mobility. However, we have suggested 
that this may be as much to do with the characteristics of workers in this 
sector as the intrinsic effect of the sector itself. The removal of controls on 
private-rental housing has led to a rapid rise in rents but only a very small 
change in the use of it, so it does not seem likely that dramatic changes to 
the structure of the housing market will be able to transform the system. It 
is not clear that the obstacles to migration at the moment are substantial. 
The costs of moving house (estate agent fees and transaction taxes-stamp 
duty) are low by international standards. It may be that there is an incen- 
tive in the U.K. system to put a large fraction of one’s wealth into one’s own 
housing (MIRAS, the absence of capital gains taxation on the primary res- 
idence and the lack of taxation of  imputed rental income from owner- 
occupation), and this does expose one to the risk of a bad shock in one’s lo- 
cality, making it difficult to move from a region in recession to one that is 408  Paul Gregg, Stephen Machin, and Alan Manning 
booming. But it is the most educated who are most affected by this, and it 
is for this group that there seems to be a national labor market and for 
whom the U.K. labor market seems to work well. 
In terms of policy for reducing regional inequalities, there are a number 
of possible strategies. One would be to move people to the jobs. The most 
important step in doing this is to make it easier for the less skilled to search 
for and accept jobs in other regions. Providing a national database on Job 
Centre vacancies should help in this regard, and moves are being made in 
this direction. 
The other approach is to try to move jobs to the people. There are two 
ways in which this might be done. The first, which has been the basis for 
much of British regional policy, has been to provide direct employment for 
low-skilled workers in depressed areas by building factories (in the past) or 
call centers (the current reality). One can think of this employment as be- 
ing in the “traded goods sector,” as the demand for a region’s labor does not 
have to come from expenditure of people living in that region. 
However, many of the low skilled are employed in sectors that are not 
traded across regions--  for example, retail or restaurants or personal ser- 
vices. Demand for this type of labor has to come from expenditure within 
the region. The strategy proposed by Rogers and Power (2000) is to try to 
lure the highly educated back to  depressed regions and then hope that the 
expenditure of these individuals is the demand for the labor of the un- 
skilled. An area with depressed demand sees the best educated leave, re- 
sulting in a further reduction in the demand for low-skilled 1ab0r.I~  The ap- 
propriateness of these two strategies does depend on the extent to which 
the low skilled are employed in traded goods sectors and the fraction of the 
expenditure of the highly skilled that is within the region where they live. 
These are interesting questions for further research. 
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